Death as Liberty by Nguyen, Christina Q.
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By CHRISTINA Q. NGUYEN*
MARLISE MUN˜OZ was approximately fourteen weeks pregnant
when she collapsed at her home in Texas on November 26, 2013,1 and
was declared brain dead at John Peter Smith Hospital on November
28, 2013.2 Mrs. Mun˜oz, however, continued to receive post-mortem,
life-sustaining medical treatment through January 26, 2014,3 despite
expressing to her husband and parents that she did not wish to re-
main on life support.4 By virtue of being pregnant, Mrs. Mun˜oz’ end-
of-life decision was preempted by the Texas Advance Directives Act,5
which otherwise recognizes a competent patient’s decision to discon-
tinue and withhold medical treatment.6 Mrs. Mun˜oz was twenty-two
weeks pregnant7 when she was removed from life-support on January
26, 2014,8 after a state trial court held that the Texas Advance Direc-
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1. Stipulation of Facts at 1, Mun˜oz v. John Peter Smith Hosp., No. 096-270080-14
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Jan. 24, 2014).
2. Id. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 671.001(b) (West 2013) (“[T]he per-
son is dead when, in the announced opinion of a physician, according to ordinary stan-
dards of medical practice, there is irreversible cessation of all spontaneous brain
function.”).
3. Matt Pearce, Pregnant, Brain-dead Texas Woman Taken off Life Support, L.A. TIMES
(Jan. 26, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/jan/26/nation/la-na-nn-texas-pregnant-
woman-20140126.
4. Affidavit of Erick Mun˜oz at 2, Mun˜oz v. John Peter Smith Hosp., No. 096-270080-
14 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Jan. 23, 2014).
5. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166 (West 2013) (Advance Directives Act);
id. § 166.049 (“A person may not withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment under this
subchapter from a pregnant patient.”); id. § 166.098 (“A person may not withhold cardi-
opulmonary resuscitation or certain other life-sustaining treatment designated by the
board under this subchapter from a person known by the responding health care profes-
sionals to be pregnant.”).
6. §§ 166.031–033 (identifying competent adult’s ability to execute directive regard-
ing end-of-life decision-making and providing directive template).
7. Stipulation of Facts, supra note 1, at 1.
8. Pearce, supra note 3.
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tives Act was inapplicable because Mrs. Mun˜oz was considered legally
and medically dead.9
Jahi McMath, a thirteen-year-old eighth-grade girl, underwent a
routine tonsillectomy at Children’s Hospital Oakland in California on
December 9, 2013,10 and was later declared brain-dead on December
12, 2013, after suffering from a heart attack.11 Ms. McMath’s mother,
Latasha Winkfield, requested that her daughter continue to receive
life-sustaining medical treatment based on the family’s religious belief
that life ends when the heart stops beating.12 Children’s Hospital Oak-
land refused to comply with Ms. Winkfield’s request13 on the ground
that Ms. McMath was legally and medically dead pursuant to Califor-
nia’s Uniform Determination of Death Act14 and that the hospital met
its legal obligation by accommodating the family for a reasonably brief
period so that they could gather by her bedside.15 Yet, Ms. McMath
presently remains on post-mortem, life-sustaining medical treatment16
after her mother and Children’s Hospital Oakland reached a stipula-
tion17 to remove Ms. McMath to another healthcare facility.18 Pursu-
9. Judgment at 1, Mun˜oz v. John Peter Smith Hosp., No. 096-270080-14 (Tex. Dist.
Ct. Jan. 24, 2014) [hereinafter Mun˜oz Judgment] (granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel
the hospital to remove Mun˜oz from life-sustaining treatment after finding the provisions of
§ 166.049 inapplicable because Mrs. Mun˜oz is deceased). See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 671.001 (West 2013) (defining death to include irreversible cessation of spontane-
ous brain function).
10. Complaint at 3, Winkfield v. Children’s Hosp. Oakland, No. 4:13CV05993 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 3, 2013).
11. Id. at 4.
12. Id. at 3–4.
13. Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Opposition to Ex Parte Application for
Temporary Restraining Order at 4, Winkfield v. Children’s Hosp. of Oakland, No. RP13-
707598 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Mem. of P. & A.].
14. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180(a) (West 2007) (“An individual who has
sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2)
irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is
dead.”).
15. See id. § 1254.4(a) (“A general acute care hospital shall adopt a policy for provid-
ing family or next of kin with a reasonably brief period of accommodation, . . . from the
time that a patient is declared dead by reason of irreversible cessation of all functions of
the entire brain, including the brain stem, in accordance with Section 7180, through dis-
continuation of cardiopulmonary support for the patient.”); Mem. of P. & A., supra note
13, at 3.
16. Jason Wells, Mother of Brain-dead Jahi McMath Says Daughter is “Still Sleeping,” L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 28, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/28/local/la-me-ln-brain-
dead-jahi-mcmath-mother-speaks-20140328.
17. Stipulation for Protocol for Possible Removal of Jahi McMath from Children’s
Hosp. at 1–2, Winkfield v. Children’s Hosp. of Oakland, No. RP13-707598 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Jan. 3, 2014) [hereinafter Stipulation for Protocol] (requiring that the Coroner formally
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ant to the stipulation,19 Children’s Hospital Oakland released Ms.
McMath to the Alameda County coroner’s office, which issued a death
certificate recording the date of death as December 12, 2013, the date
Ms. McMath was declared brain-dead, before releasing Ms. McMath to
her family.20
Mrs. Mun˜oz and Ms. McMath were both declared brain-dead,
which Texas and California recognize as the irreversible cessation of
all spontaneous brain function.21 Additionally, both women were pa-
tients in states that permit healthcare providers to decline to comply
with an individual’s medical decision or instruction.22 But that is
where the similarities end. Mrs. Mun˜oz and Ms. McMath’s families
had opposite requests for relief: respectively, the right to refuse un-
wanted medical treatment, and the right to prolong life using availa-
ble life-sustaining medical treatment, even when continued treatment
may be futile.
This Comment explores whether Texas and California legisla-
tion,23 giving healthcare providers discretion as to whether to effectu-
ate a patient’s end-of-life decision, implicates a patient’s personal
accept the body from the hospital, and that Ms. Winkfield assume exclusive responsibility
for Ms. McMath at the moment of transfer).
18. Ms. McMath’s family and her attorney refused to disclose the location of the
healthcare facility after the parties reached the stipulation. Norimitsu Onishi, California:
Girl Declared Dead is Transferred, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2014, at A13. On October 2, 2014, the
attorney and family confirmed reports that Ms. McMath was receiving life-sustaining medi-
cal treatment in New Jersey. See Lee Romney, Tests Show Jahi McMath has Brain Activity,
Lawyer Says, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-
medical-experts-jahi-mcmath-20141002-story.html.
19. See Stipulation for Protocol, supra note 17, at 1–2. On September 30, 2014, Ms.
Winkfield, Ms. McMath’s mother, filed a petition to overturn the brain death determina-
tion. Memorandum Regarding Court’s Jurisdiction to Hear Petition for Determination
that Jahi McMath Is Not Brain Dead at 1–2, 4, Winkfield v. Children’s Hosp. of Oakland,
No. RP13-707598 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2014). A scheduled hearing was postponed and
it is unclear when this petition will be heard. See Marisa Lagos, Jahi McMath Hearing Post-
poned After Doctor’s Determination, S.F. GATE (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/
bayarea/article/Jahi-McMath-hearing-postponed-after-doctor-s-5810707.php.
20. Onishi, supra note 18.
21. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 671.001(b) (West 2013); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7180(a) (West 2007).
22. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (West 2013) (setting forth proce-
dures for ethics committee review applicable when physician refuses to honor patient’s
advance directive); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4654, 4734–36 (West 2009) (permitting physician
to decline to comply with advance directive due to conscience or medical ineffectiveness).
23. Health Care Decisions Law, CAL. PROB. CODE § 4600 (West 2009); Advance Direc-
tives Act, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.
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autonomy24 sufficient to trigger the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.25 Part I of this Comment examines the Four-
teenth Amendment’s substantive due process doctrine and the United
States Supreme Court’s reluctance to expand fundamental rights with
respect to medical decisions. Part II of the Comment examines the
Texas and California legislative schemes in response to the Court’s
recognition of the individual liberty interest to refuse unwanted medi-
cal treatment. Part III explores the impact on personal autonomy and
equality. Specifically it examines the rights implicated in Mrs. Mun˜oz
and Ms. McMath’s situation, and uses these circumstances to demon-
strate the perplexing and paradoxical interplay between medical
death and personal autonomy that results from Texas and California’s
recognition of medical futility.
I. Substantive Due Process: the Court’s Careful Evasion of
Expanding Fundamental Rights
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause has both a pro-
cedural and substantive26 component that protects personal auton-
omy by prohibiting the government from depriving “any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”27 In a substantive
due process challenge, the Supreme Court usually applies a two-part
test to determine whether the government has infringed a fundamen-
tal right or liberty interest.28 First, the Court objectively examines
whether the asserted fundamental right or liberty interest is both
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.”29 Second, the Court requires a “care-
24. See generally Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (considering
the constitutional implications of a third party’s participation in end-of-life decision-mak-
ing regarding an incompetent person).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
26. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–20 (1997) (“The Due Process Clause
guarantees more than fair process, and the ‘liberty’ it protects includes more than the
absence of physical restraint. The Clause also provides heightened protection against gov-
ernment interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.”) (citations
omitted).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
28. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21.
29. Id. at 720–21 (citations omitted). But see Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977) (requiring asserted fundamental right or liberty interest to only be deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26
(1937) (in the alternative, requiring asserted fundamental right or liberty interest to only
be implicit in ordered liberty); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 578 (2003) (invalidat-
ing the state’s criminalization of same-sex sodomy, without reference to whether the per-
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ful description” of the asserted fundamental right or liberty interest.30
If the Court recognizes the existence of a fundamental right or liberty
interest, any governmental infringement must be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.31 If the Court refuses to recognize
the asserted fundamental right or liberty interest, governmental in-
fringement need only be rationally related to legitimate government
interests.32
Where the government deprives a recognized fundamental right
or liberty interest, the nature of the right determines the standard of
review. The Court has applied strict scrutiny to marriage,33 parental
control of family upbringing,34 procreation,35 and contraception,36
but different standards of review to abortion37 and medical deci-
sonal autonomy that encompasses thought, expression, and certain intimate conduct was
deeply rooted in history and tradition and implicit in ordered liberty).
30. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21. But see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The petitioners
are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or
control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty
under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the government.”).
31. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 728.
33. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations.
Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race
resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”).
34. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400–01 (1923) (invalidating statute prohibiting
educating children in a non-English language because it interferes with a parent’s power to
control his or her child’s education); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)
(invalidating statute requiring children to attend public schools because it interfered with
parental power); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72–73 (2000) (“[T]he Due Process
Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make
child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be
made.”).
35. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (invalidating sterilization statute
applicable to armed robbers but not embezzlers based on Equal Protection Clause, while
also recognizing the liberty interest to procreate); id. at 544 (Stone, J., concurring) (“And
so I think the real question we have to consider is not one of equal protection, but whether
the wholesale condemnation of a class to such an invasion of personal liberty, without
opportunity to any individual to show that his is not the type of case which would justify
resort to it, satisfies the demands of due process.”).
36. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (invalidating statute that
prohibited use of contraception by recognizing intrusion on right to marital privacy); Ei-
senstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.”); Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685, 693 (1977) (invalidat-
ing statute that prohibited sale of contraception to minors).
37. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846
(1992) (“First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion
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sions.38 In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the
Court held that laws imposing an undue burden by substantially
preventing a woman from getting an abortion are invalid, but that
laws imposing incidental burdens that merely frustrate a woman’s ex-
ercise of this right are permissible.39 In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Dept. of Health, the Court balanced a patient’s liberty interest in refus-
ing unwanted medical treatment against the government’s interest in
keeping the patient alive.40
When given the opportunity to expand the recognition of addi-
tional asserted fundamental rights or liberty interests, the Court has
tended to exercise restraint.41 This trend has become especially appar-
ent when examining rights with respect to individual medical
decisions.
before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State. Before viability,
the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the
imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the proce-
dure.”); id. (“Second is a confirmation of the State’s power to restrict abortions after fetal
viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or
health.”); id. at 847 (“It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter.”); id. at 851 (“At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of per-
sonhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.”).
38. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (“The principle that
a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.”).
39. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (“The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not
designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or
more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. Only where state
regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision does the
power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause.”).
40. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 (“But determining that a person has a ‘liberty interest’
under the Due Process Clause does not end the inquiry; whether respondent’s constitu-
tional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests
against the relevant state interests.”) (citations omitted).
41. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“We must therefore ‘exer-
cise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field,’ lest the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy prefer-
ences of the Members of this Court.”) (citations omitted). See also San Antonio Indepen-
dent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34–35 (1973) (“Education, of course, is not
among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we
find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”). But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 578 (2003) (invalidating the state’s criminalization of same-sex sodomy, though silent
regarding level of scrutiny applied).
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In Cruzan, the Court first addressed whether an individual pos-
sesses a right to die.42 Nancy Cruzan was in a permanent, persistent
vegetative state as a result of severe injuries she sustained in a car acci-
dent.43 When it became clear that Ms. Cruzan had no chance of recov-
ery, her parents requested that the hospital cease all life-sustaining
treatment, but the hospital refused to do so without a court order.44
The Missouri Supreme Court denied the parents’ request because, in
the absence of a patient’s advance healthcare directive,45 statutory law
required clear and convincing evidence of the patient’s end-of-life de-
cision to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment.46
In granting certiorari, the Court shifted away from deciding
whether the constitution guarantees a broad right to die and, instead,
narrowly addressed whether a patient in the same or similar circum-
stances would have a constitutional right to terminate life-sustaining
medical treatment.47 The Court inferred that competent individuals
have a “constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing un-
wanted medical treatment,” but confined its inference to a “constitu-
tionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”48
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the common law doc-
trine of informed consent and the right to be free of unwanted touch-
ing to preserve bodily integrity.49 The Court further indicated that the
“logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the pa-
tient generally possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse
treatment.”50
The Court balanced the individual’s liberty interest in refusing
unwanted lifesaving hydration and nutrition against the government’s
“interest in the protection and preservation of human life.”51 The
42. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277 (“This is the first case in which we have been squarely
presented with the issue whether the United States Constitution grants what is in common
parlance referred to as a ‘right to die.’”).
43. Id. at 266.
44. Id. at 267–68.
45. See Advance Care Directives, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.ama-assn
.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/about-ethics-group/ethics-resource-
center/end-of-life-care/advance-care-directives.page? (last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (describ-
ing advance care directives as tools that allow patients to take an active role in their own
health care, and communicate their health and treatment wishes to physicians, proxies,
and loved ones).
46. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 265, 269.
47. Id. at 269.
48. Id. at 278–79.
49. Id. at 269–70, 277.
50. Id. at 270.
51. Id. at 280.
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Court held that it was permissible for the government to require clear
and convincing evidence of the individual’s end-of-life decision prior
to terminating treatment because any error “is not susceptible of cor-
rection,” and the procedural requirement advanced the government’s
interest in life.52 Furthermore, the Court indicated that the govern-
ment may maintain an “unqualified interest” in the preservation of
human life without considering the quality of that life.53 The Court
did not address whether an individual’s surrogate decision-maker has
either of these protected liberty interests.54
Seven years later in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court declined
to expand the liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment
beyond refusing lifesaving hydration and nutrition when Washing-
ton’s assisted-suicide ban was challenged under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.55
Instead of addressing the broadly asserted interests of an individ-
ual’s “liberty to choose how to die”56 and right to “control of one’s
final days,”57 the Court narrowly and carefully characterized the as-
serted interest as the right to assisted suicide.58 The Court held that
assisted suicide was neither “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition,” nor “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”59 To the
contrary, the Court explained that bans on assisted suicide were
deeply rooted in our Nation’s history.60 Furthermore, the Court stated
that the Due Process Clause does not broadly protect all decisions re-
lated to personal autonomy.61
The Court held that Washington’s assisted-suicide ban was ration-
ally related to several legitimate government interests.62 Like Cruzan,
the government had an “unqualified interest in the preservation of
human life,” without regard to the quality of that life, which was di-
52. Id. at 280–83.
53. Id. at 282.
54. Id. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
55. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725 (1997) (“The decision to commit
suicide with the assistance of another may be just as personal and profound as the decision
to refuse unwanted medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar legal protection.”).
56. Id. at 703, 722.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 703, 722, 724.
59. Id. at 710, 716, 728.
60. Id. at 710–16 (recounting history of criminalization of assisted suicide).
61. Id. at 727 (“That many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any
and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected.”).
62. Id. at 728.
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rectly advanced by the assisted-suicide ban.63 Furthermore, the as-
sisted-suicide ban reflected the government’s interest in suicide
prevention.64 The government additionally had a legitimate interest
in protecting vulnerable groups, preventing “voluntary and perhaps
even involuntary euthanasia,” and protecting the “integrity and ethics
of the medical profession,” specifically because “[p]hysician-assisted
suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the physician’s role as
healer.”65
At the same time Glucksberg was decided, the Court in Vacco v.
Quill held that New York’s assisted-suicide ban did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause because it “neither
infringe[d] fundamental rights nor involve[d] suspect
classifications.”66
The Court held that the assisted-suicide ban and statutes permit-
ting the refusal of unwanted medical treatment did not treat compe-
tent individuals unequally because “[e]veryone, regardless of physical
condition, is entitled, if competent, to refuse unwanted lifesaving
medical treatment; no one is permitted to assist a suicide.”67 Addition-
ally, the Court stated that the refusal of unwanted medical treatment
was not equivalent to physician-assisted suicide, and that distinctions
are recognized by the medical profession, especially in connection
with “fundamental legal principles of causation and intent.”68 The
Court indicated that when a patient expresses the desire not to be
subject to life-sustaining medical treatment, a healthcare provider ter-
minates futile treatment that has no benefit with the intent to respect
the patient’s decision, whereas physician-assisted suicide requires a
physician’s intent that the patient die.69 The Court stated that the dis-
tinctions were rationally related to all of the legitimate government
ends that were identified in Glucksberg.70
Cruzan, Glucksberg, and Quill are a trilogy of cases that restricted,
as opposed to expanded, the liberty to make end-of-life decisions.71 In
Glucksberg and Quill, the Court clearly drew a line between assisted
63. Id.; Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990).
64. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728, 730.
65. Id. at 731–33 (citations omitted).
66. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997).
67. Id. at 800.
68. Id. at 800–01.
69. Id. at 801–02.
70. Id. at 808–09.
71. Compare Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), and Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (trilogy restricting liberty to make
end-of-life decisions), with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965), Eisen-
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suicide and Cruzan’s recognition of the liberty interest to refuse un-
wanted medical treatment.72 But the line is less than clear between the
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment and the corollary right to
continue life-sustaining medical treatment, even where continued
treatment may be futile. The perplexing question—whether there is a
legitimate distinction—is left to the states.
II. Recognition of Medical Futility in the California and
Texas Legislative Schemes
In California and Texas, when a patient or patient’s family wishes
to continue or discontinue life-sustaining medical treatment, health-
care providers have discretion to decline to comply with these medical
instructions and may terminate treatment without consent.73 Addi-
tionally, both California and Texas recognize that when a patient is
declared brain-dead, healthcare providers have nearly unlimited dis-
cretion to withdraw all life-sustaining medical treatment upon satisfy-
ing procedural safeguards described below.74 These legislative
schemes attempt to balance a patient’s personal autonomy with the
integrity and ethics of the medical profession, but make clear that an
asserted right to refuse medical treatment or prolong life using availa-
ble life-sustaining medical treatment is not absolute.75
Pursuant to the Texas Advance Directives Act, a healthcare pro-
vider who refuses to submit to a patient’s medical decision or instruc-
tion must inform the patient or patient’s surrogate, and the
healthcare provider’s decision is reviewed by an ethics or medical
committee.76 The patient or patient’s surrogate is informed of the
committee review process, and is entitled to meet with the committee
and receive a written decision.77 Where the healthcare provider, pa-
tient, or surrogate disagrees with the committee’s decision, the health-
care provider must make a “reasonable effort” to transfer the patient
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), and Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S.
678, 685, 693 (1977) (trilogy expanding the right to contraception).
72. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278–79.
73. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (West 2013); CAL. PROB. CODE
§§ 4654, 4734–36 (West 2009).
74. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046(e)–(f); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1254.4 (West Supp. 2015).
75. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731–33.
76. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046(a)–(b).
77. Id. § 166.046(b).
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to a physician or healthcare facility that will comply with the patient’s
wishes.78
But where a committee agrees that a patient is brain-dead, a
healthcare provider may stop life-sustaining medical treatment if the
surrogate is unable to transfer the patient to another physician or
healthcare facility within ten days of the committee’s decision, unless
an extension of time is granted pursuant to a court order.79
Despite these procedural safeguards, the Texas Advance Direc-
tives Act does not recognize a pregnant female patient’s end-of-life
decision.80 By virtue of being pregnant, a female patient is wholly dis-
qualified from refusing unwanted medical treatment, and a health-
care provider is compelled to continue life-sustaining medical
treatment over a pregnant female patient’s objection, even when con-
tinued treatment may be futile.81 This disqualifying factor for preg-
nant female patients does not distinguish between fetal pre-viability
and post-viability.82 Additionally, even if a competent female patient
contemplates circumstances such as a pregnancy and executes a writ-
ten advance healthcare directive refusing life-sustaining medical treat-
ment, this outcome is unavoidable because the directive explicitly
acknowledges the following: “I understand that under Texas law this
directive has no effect if I have been diagnosed as pregnant.”83
California’s Health Care Decisions Law is similar to the Texas Ad-
vance Directives Act, but does not include a disqualifying factor for
pregnant female patients.84 But unlike Texas, California does not re-
78. Id. § 166.046(d).
79. Id. § 166.046(e), (g).
80. Id. § 166.049.
81. Id. §§ 166.046, 166.049.
82. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860
(1992) (“[V]iability marks the earliest point at which the State’s interest in fetal life is
constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions. The
soundness or unsoundness of that constitutional judgment in no sense turns on whether
viability occurs at approximately 28 weeks, as was usual at the time of Roe [v. Wade], at 23 to
24 weeks, as it sometimes does today, or at some moment even slightly earlier in preg-
nancy, as it may if fetal respiratory capacity can somehow be enhanced in the future.
Whenever it may occur, the attainment of viability may continue to serve as the critical
fact.”). See also I. Glenn Cohen & Sadath Sayeed, Fetal Pain, Abortion, Viability, and the Consti-
tution, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 235, 237 (2011) (“Working clinical definitions of viability
involve human interpretation of statistical probabilities that are typically applied to a class
of about-to-be-born fetuses. That is, they are not individual patient-specific, and as such,
also likely (and in some cases subconsciously) represent a collective consensus about scarce
resource allocation. As our chances of success diminish, it becomes less compelling to offer
an intervention.”).
83. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.033.
84. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4600 (West 2009).
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quire that a healthcare provider’s refusal to comply with a patient’s
medical decision or instruction be subject to review by an ethics or
medical committee, unless the patient is declared brain-dead.85 Cali-
fornia healthcare providers may decline to comply on the ground that
the requested treatment is “medically ineffective,”86 “contrary to gen-
erally accepted health care standards,”87 or for “reasons of
conscience.”88
Where a healthcare provider determines that a patient is brain-
dead, California’s Uniform Determination of Death Act requires an
independent physician to confirm the prognosis.89 Additionally, a
physician has an obligation to accommodate the family for a “reasona-
bly brief period” so that they can gather by the patient’s bedside. The
physician must also inform the patient’s family of this policy in writ-
ing.90 Furthermore, a physician must make “reasonable efforts” to ac-
commodate asserted religious or cultural practices made by the
patient or patient’s family.91 In determining what is reasonable, a
healthcare facility is permitted to consider the scarcity of medical re-
sources for current and incoming patients.92
Where a patient is brain-dead and upon satisfying procedural re-
quirements, both Texas and California give healthcare providers
broad authority to cease life-sustaining medical treatment without the
patient or surrogate’s consent.93 This may be because healthcare prov-
iders widely characterize brain death as a clear example of medical
futility.94
85. Id. § 4736; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1254.4 (West Supp. 2015).
86. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4735 (West 2009) (Law Revision Commission Comments, 1999
Addition) (“Medically ineffective health care, as used in this section, means treatment
which would not offer the patient any significant benefit.”).
87. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4735.
88. Id. § 4734.
89. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7180–81 (West 2007).
90. Id. § 1254(a)–(c).
91. Id. § 1254(c)(2).
92. Id. § 1254(d) (“For purposes of this section, in determining what is reasonable, a
hospital shall consider the needs of other patients and prospective patients in urgent need
of care.”).
93. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046(d)–(f) (West 2013). The effect of the
broad authority granted in sections (e)–(f) is limited by section (d), which requires health-
care providers to undertake reasonable efforts to transfer the patient to a facility willing to
comply with the directive. Id. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1254.4(a) (West Supp. 2015).
The effect of the broad authority granted in section (a) is limited by section (b)(2), which
requires healthcare providers to undertake reasonable efforts to accommodate a decision-
maker’s religious and cultural practices. Id.
94. James L. Bernat, Medical Futility Definition, Determination, and Disputes in Critical
Care, 2 NEUROCRITICAL CARE 198, 200 (2005) (“Brain death is a clear case where the quanti-
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“[M]edical futility refers to a physician’s prognostic pronounce-
ment that as a consequence of irretrievable illness or injury, further
therapy will not improve the patient’s condition and, therefore,
should not be attempted.”95 Medical futility has a quantitative compo-
nent that measures the probability that the treatment will succeed,
and a qualitative component that measures the probability that the
treatment will provide a benefit to the patient.96 Further medical
treatment is considered futile if there is zero probability the treatment
will neither succeed nor provide a benefit to the patient, but also if
the desired outcome, although possible, is overwhelmingly
improbable.97
Brain death is the irreversible cessation of all spontaneous brain
function,98 and there is zero probability that further medical treat-
ment will restore the patient’s life.99 Indeed, continuing treatment
under these circumstances is incompatible with the physician’s role as
healer and undermines the integrity and ethics of the medical
profession.100
But in the absence of brain death, a healthcare provider’s discre-
tion to decline to continue life-sustaining medical treatment has
broad implications on patients’ rights when there is a lack of consen-
sus among healthcare providers regarding whether further medical
treatment will succeed or provide a benefit to the patient.101 There
are further implications when there is a lack of consensus regarding
tative component of futility is met, because no treatment can help save the patient’s life.”).
See also Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally Refuse
Life-sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 3, 27 (2007) (“Perhaps the clearest case of medi-
cally inappropriate care is LSMT [life-sustaining medical treatment] requested for a brain
dead patient.”).
95. Bernat, supra note 94, at 198.
96. Id. at 199; Pope, supra note 94, at 26.
97. Bernat, supra note 94, at 199.
98. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 671.001(b) (West 2013); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7180(a) (West 2007).
99. Bernat, supra note 94, at 200.
100. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731–33 (1997) (reasoning that physi-
cian-assisted suicide, generally, threatens medical ethics by blurring the line between harm-
ing and healing, and erodes trust in a physician’s complete dedication to the patient’s best
interests); Pope, supra note 94, at 17 (“Health care providers want to shorten and ease
patient suffering; they do not want to cause or prolong it.”).
101. Denise Grady, PET Scans Offer Clues on Vegetative States, N.Y. TIMES, April 15, 2014,
at A9.
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whether treatment should be declared medically futile even if there is
a slim success rate as opposed to a zero percent success rate.102
III. Impact on Personal Autonomy and Equality.
The impact of a healthcare provider’s broad authority to override
a patient’s personal autonomy in making medical decisions largely de-
pends on whether a patient asserts the right to refuse unwanted medi-
cal treatment, or the right to prolong life using available life-
sustaining medical treatment even where continued treatment may be
futile.
A. Right to Refuse Unwanted Medical Treatment
In Cruzan, the Supreme Court recognized that the right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment is a liberty interest,103 but that the inter-
est must be balanced against the government’s interests.104 Both Cali-
fornia and Texas recognize a competent patient’s decision to
discontinue and withhold medical treatment,105 while also recogniz-
ing that healthcare providers have discretion to decline to comply
with these decisions.106
1. The Texas Advance Directives Act Violates Equal Protection
The Texas Advance Directives Act, however, goes further by only
recognizing a patient’s decision to discontinue and withhold medical
treatment so long as the patient is not a pregnant female.107 Unlike
Quill, a patient’s decision to discontinue and withhold medical treat-
ment is not treated equally regardless of physical condition because
the statute does not protect pregnant female patients who express this
desire.108 This is arguably a sex-based classification that violates Equal
Protection principles.
102. Bernat, supra note 94, at 199 (“[S]ome physicians do not declare a therapy futile
unless the success rate is 0%, whereas others consider it futile even with a success rate as
high as 13%.”).
103. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–79 (1990).
104. Id. at 279 (“But determining that a person has a ‘liberty interest’ under the Due
Process Clause does not end the inquiry; whether respondent’s constitutional rights have
been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant
state interests.”) (citations omitted).
105. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.032 (West 2013); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4650
(West 2009).
106. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046; CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4654, 4734–36.
107. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049.
108. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 800 (1997); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 166.049.
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The Court in Geduldig v. Aiello, with respect to California’s disabil-
ity insurance system that excluded pregnancy-related disabilities, but
included disabilities that only affected men, indicated that “[w]hile it
is true that only women can become pregnant it does not follow that
every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based
classification.”109 The Texas Advance Directives Act is distinguishable
because it unequally suppresses the personal autonomy to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment, and strips the liberty interest to choose
an end-of-life decision on the basis of sex. In Texas, persons may exe-
cute a written advance healthcare directive and elect whether to re-
fuse unwanted medical treatment, or prolong life using all available
life-sustaining medical treatment.110 However, the Texas Advance Di-
rectives Act neither respects a pregnant female patient’s decision to
refuse unwanted medical treatment, nor a non-pregnant female’s
preference to terminate life-sustaining medical treatment under all
circumstances.111
Where a female patient contemplates the possibility of a preg-
nancy and consciously chooses to discontinue unwanted medical treat-
ment despite a pregnancy, Texas categorically forces all female
patients to explicitly acknowledge that the written advance healthcare
directive is not effective if the female patient is pregnant.112 Female
patients are effectively excluded from discontinuing and withholding
unwanted medical treatment, meaning that the only real choice fe-
male patients have is to prolong their life using all available life-sus-
taining medical treatment, whereas male patients retain the liberty to
choose between refusing or electing life-sustaining medical treat-
ment.113 The Texas Advance Directives Act, therefore, unequally in-
fringes the autonomy to refuse unwanted medical treatment in
violation of Cruzan on the basis of sex.114
2. The Texas Advance Directives Act Violates Substantive Due
Process
The Texas Advance Directives Act also violates substantive due
process because the disqualifying factor for pregnant female patients
does not distinguish between fetal pre-viability and post-viability,115
109. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974).
110. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.033.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–79 (1990).
115. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.033, 166.049.
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and therefore does not accommodate pregnant female patients’ inter-
est in exercising their fundamental right to an abortion.116  While the
government’s “unqualified interest”117 in keeping the pregnant fe-
male patient alive to preserve the potential life of the fetus may justify
stripping a pregnant female patient’s liberty interest to refuse life-sus-
taining medical treatment,118 the Texas Advance Directives Act im-
poses an undue burden on the patient’s personal autonomy to seek
an abortion before the fetus attains viability.119 Casey has made clear
that such burdens are constitutionally impermissible.120
When a pregnant female patient requests to cease life-sustaining
medical treatment, the incidental result is an abortion. But by barring
pregnant female patients from electing to refuse unwanted medical
treatment irrespective of viability, the Texas Advance Directives Act
takes the fundamental right to abortion completely off the table.121
Furthermore, the Texas Advance Directives Act is not calculated to
persuade a woman to evaluate her options when making an end-of-life
decision, but instead disqualifies and deprives her of the ability to
make an informed decision because the government has already de-
cided for her.122 The disqualifying factor for pregnant female patients
is a mechanism to prevent pre-viability abortions, and imposes an un-
due burden by wholly prohibiting a pregnant female patient from ter-
minating her pregnancy by refusing unwanted, life-sustaining medical
treatment.123
116. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878–79
(1992) (“An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose
or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
before the fetus attains viability. . . . Regardless of whether exceptions are made for particu-
lar circumstances, a State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision
to terminate her pregnancy before viability.”).
117. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (“Washington has an unqual-
ified interest in the preservation of human life.”); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280–82.
118. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278–79 (“[D]etermining that a person has a liberty interest
under the Due Process Clause does not end the inquiry; whether respondent’s constitu-
tional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests
against the relevant state interests.”).
119. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846, 878–79.
120. Id.
121. Id. (“[A] state may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to
terminate her pregnancy before viability.”).
122. Id. (“To promote the State’s profound interest in potential life, throughout preg-
nancy the State may take measures to ensure that the woman’s choice is informed, and
measures designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their purpose
is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion. These measures must not be
an undue burden on the right.”).
123. Id.
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The circumstances of Mrs. Mun˜oz’ case presents a bizarre dichot-
omy in the Texas Advance Directives Act. The Texas trial court held
that the Texas Advance Directives Act was inapplicable because Mrs.
Mun˜oz was brain-dead, and thus legally and medically dead.124 The
court did not rule on the constitutional challenges to the disqualifying
factor for pregnant female patients,125 and therefore did not balance
the government’s interest in the preservation of human life, by sub-
jecting Mrs. Mun˜oz to eight weeks of post-mortem, life-sustaining
medical treatment,126 against Mrs. Mun˜oz’ personal autonomy to re-
fuse unwanted medical treatment127 and to seek an abortion before
the fetus attains viability.128 The court also did not indicate whether
the disqualifying factor permissibly protected a woman’s health, or im-
permissibly posed an undue burden on a woman’s right to an abor-
tion.129 Nor did the court address whether the fact that the fetus was
not viable even at twenty-two weeks, at the time of the hearing, had
any bearing on the court’s holding.130
The court’s ruling suggests that when a pregnant female patient
is declared brain-dead, healthcare providers should recognize the pa-
tient’s personal autonomy to discontinue medical treatment131 be-
cause the Texas Advance Directives Act’s disqualifying factor is
inapplicable under these circumstances, regardless of fetal viability.132
This also suggests that because there is zero probability that further
medical treatment will restore a brain-dead patient’s life, continued
post-mortem treatment is futile,133 incompatible with the physician’s
124. Mun˜oz Judgment, supra note 9, at 1; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 671.001
(West 2013).
125. Mun˜oz Judgment, supra note 9, at 1; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 166.033, 166.049.
126. Stipulation of Facts, supra note 1, at 1.
127. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–79 (1990).
128. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846, 878–79.
129. Id. at 878 (“As with any medical procedure, the State may enact regulations to
further the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion. Unnecessary health regula-
tions that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seek-
ing an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.”).
130. Stipulation of Facts, supra note 1, at 2.
131. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278–79 (“The principle that a competent person has a consti-
tutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be in-
ferred from our prior decisions.”).
132. Mun˜oz Judgment, supra note 9, at 1; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 671.001
(West 2013).
133. Bernat, supra note 94, at 199 (“Medical futility generates two criteria that comprise
independent variables: so-called quantitative and qualitative futility assessments. The quan-
titative component is the numerical probability that an act will produce the desired physio-
logical effect. The qualitative component is the numerical probability that the
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role as a healer, and undermines the integrity and ethics of the medi-
cal profession.134 Yet, fetal viability may arguably justify the infringe-
ment of a brain-dead pregnant female patient’s personal autonomy to
both refuse unwanted medical treatment135 and to terminate her
pregnancy.136 Additionally, where a pregnant female patient is brain-
dead, the government arguably does not need to consider risks to the
patient’s health because she is legally and medically dead.137 As such,
the government may easily advance its interest in preserving the po-
tential life of the fetus with post-viability abortion restrictions.138
The court’s ruling also suggests that a pregnant female patient,
who is in an irreversible persistent vegetative state, and who will not
benefit from further medical treatment,139 may be stripped of the per-
sonal autonomy to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.140 This
leads to a perplexing result because when a patient is brain-dead or in
an irreversible persistent vegetative state, continued treatment under
either circumstance is futile141 and incompatible with the physician’s
role as healer.142 Though death distinguishes an irreversible persistent
vegetative state from brain death, the quantitative component that
measures the probability that the treatment will succeed and the quali-
tative component that measures the probability that the treatment will
provide a benefit to the patient is the same if both conditions are truly
irreversible.143 The court’s ruling seems to suggest that where there is
physiological effect will benefit the patient. A futility calculation is the product of the quan-
titative and qualitative components. As either component approaches zero, the product
approaches zero, and the act becomes futile.”).
134. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731–33 (1997) (recognizing the ethical
dilemma that arises for physicians when the line between healing and harming is blurred);
Pope, supra note 94, at 15–16.
135. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278–79.
136. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846
(1992) (“[T]he state has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protect-
ing the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.”).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See generally Bernat, supra note 94, at 198–99 (addressing the concept of medical
futility, which is the consequence of irreversible illness or injury that future therapy cannot
improve).
140. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278–79.
141. Bernat, supra note 94, at 198–99.
142. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West 2013); Bernat, supra note 94,
at 198–99 (“The determination of medical futility has an immediate ethical implication:
because further therapy in this situation is futile and cannot help the patient, physicians
have no ethical obligation to provide it, even when the therapy in question is requested or
even demanded by the patient’s family. Some scholars have further asserted that based on
concepts of justice, physicians have an ethical duty not to prescribe futile therapy.”).
143. Bernat, supra note 94, at 199; Pope, supra note 94, at 26.
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brain death, the government’s interest in life is outweighed by the
integrity and ethics of the medical profession, which would be under-
mined if healthcare providers were compelled to provide futile post-
mortem treatment.144 However, in the absence of brain death, the in-
tegrity and ethics of the medical profession hold less weight because
there is a lack of consensus among healthcare providers regarding
whether further medical treatment will succeed or provide a benefit
to the patient.145
Thus a pregnant female patient’s ability to exercise both her per-
sonal autonomy to refuse unwanted medical treatment and to termi-
nate her pregnancy turns on the determination of legal death. This
effectively implies that the government’s interest in keeping the preg-
nant female patient alive to preserve the potential life of the fetus
dissolves upon the patient’s death, without respect to fetal viability,
and yields to the patient’s fundamental rights and liberty interests and
the integrity and ethics of the medical profession. Ultimately, in order
to retain autonomy to exercise established liberty interests in refusing
medical care and terminating pregnancy, a female patient must be
declared legally dead. Given that the entire premise of electing to
cease life-sustaining medical treatment is to permit a patient to die,
the current scheme is paradoxical.
B. Right to Prolong Life Using Available Life-Sustaining Medical
Treatment, Even Where Continued Treatment May Be
Futile
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the question
of whether there is a fundamental right or liberty interest to prolong
life using available life-sustaining medical treatment, which is the co-
rollary of the liberty interest recognized in Cruzan to discontinue and
withhold medical treatment.146 If, and when, the Court does address
144. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731–33 (1997) (recognizing the state’s
interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession while holding con-
stitutional a Washington law permitting competent, terminally ill patients to hasten death
with prescribed medication); Pope, supra note 94, at 15–16 (“The medical profession is a
self-governing one with its own standards of professional practice. . . . In particular, many
health care providers do not consider the practice of medicine to include measures aimed
solely at maintaining corporeal and biological functioning.”).
145. Grady, supra note 101 (discussing recent findings based on PET and MRI scans
that identify a significant number of individuals labeled vegetative who demonstrate signs
of consciousness and possess some potential to improve).
146. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–79 (1990) (“The principle
that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing un-
wanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.”).
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this question, history suggests the Court will likely exercise restraint147
when applying the two-part test to determine whether the government
has infringed a fundamental right or liberty interest.148
Like Texas,149 California permits persons to execute written ad-
vance healthcare directives and elect whether to refuse unwanted
medical treatment, or prolong life using available, life-sustaining med-
ical treatment “within the limits of generally accepted health care
standards.”150
To advance its interest in protecting personal autonomy,151 Cali-
fornia seeks to limit artificially prolonging life where continued treat-
ment is medically futile152 because that treatment “may violate patient
dignity and cause unnecessary pain and suffering.”153 Irrespective of
brain death, California healthcare providers may decline to comply
with a patient’s medical decision or instruction on the ground that
the requested treatment is “medically ineffective,”154 “contrary to gen-
erally accepted health care standards,”155 or for “reasons of
conscience.”156
In contrast with Texas,157 California does not require that a
healthcare provider’s refusal to comply with a patient’s medical deci-
sion or instruction be subject to review by an ethics or medical com-
mittee.158 Though, both California and Texas recognize that
healthcare providers have nearly unlimited discretion to withdraw all
life-sustaining medical treatment upon satisfying procedural safe-
guards when a patient is declared brain-dead.159
147. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
148. Id. at 720–21.
149. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.033 (West 2013).
150. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4701 (West 2009).
151. Id. § 4650(b).
152. See Bernat, supra note 94, at 204 (discussing findings that advance directive legisla-
tion has increased ethics consultations, decreased time spent making futility decisions, and
improved physician-surrogate communication); see also Pope, supra note 94, at 25–26 (re-
counting statistics of hospitals’ unilateral decision to terminate life-sustaining care, and
predicting such occurrences to increase).
153. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4650(b).
154. Id. § 4735.
155. Id.
156. Id. § 4734.
157. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (West 2013).
158. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4736.
159. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046(e)–(f); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1254.4 (West Supp. 2015).
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The circumstances of Ms. McMath’s case160 erode a healthcare
provider’s discretion to terminate futile medical treatment to brain-
dead patients, despite satisfying procedural safeguards. When treating
physicians determined that Ms. McMath was brain-dead, at least three
physicians confirmed the prognosis.161 The hospital also met its obli-
gation in accommodating Ms. McMath’s family for a reasonably brief
period so that they could gather by her bedside.162 However, irrespec-
tive of the healthcare provider’s medical conclusion that further treat-
ment would be futile, a healthcare provider must also make
“reasonable efforts” to accommodate asserted religious or cultural
practices made by the patient or patient’s family.163 The hospital ini-
tially refused to comply with Ms. Winkfield’s request that her daughter
continue to receive life-sustaining medical treatment,164 which was
based on the family’s religious beliefs that life ends when the heart
stops beating.165 Ms. Winkfield and the hospital eventually reached a
stipulation166 to remove Ms. McMath to another healthcare facility,167
160. Winkfield v. Children’s Hosp. of Oakland, No. RP13-707598 (Cal. Super. Ct.
2013).
161. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7180–81 (West 2007); Physician Declaration of
Robin Shanahan at 1, Winkfield v. Children’s Hosp. of Oakland, No. RP13-707598 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 2013); Physician Declaration of Robert Heidersbach at 1, Winkfield v.
Children’s Hosp. of Oakland, No. RP13-707598 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 2013); Lee Rom-
ney, Clock Ticks in Jahi McMath Case; Experts Say Court Clash Went Too Far, L.A. TIMES (Dec.
30, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/30/local/la-me-ln-jahi-mcmath-brain-
dead-case-20131230.
162. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1254.4(a); Mem. of P. & A., supra note 13, at 3–4
(detailing numerous measures undertaken by the hospital to provide access and support to
Ms. McMath’s family in the days after her death).
163. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1254.4(c)(2) (“If the patient’s legally recognized
health care decisionmaker, family, or next of kin voices any special religious or cultural
practices and concerns of the patient or the patient’s family surrounding the issue of death
by reason of irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain of the patient, the
hospital shall make reasonable efforts to accommodate those religious and cultural prac-
tices and concerns.”).
164. Mem. of P. & A., supra note 13, at 3–4 (“A full week after death, Children’s has
determined that the time has come to stop providing mechanical support to Ms. McMath’s
body. Accordingly, on December 19, 2013 Children’s advised Ms. McMath’s family/next of
kin of their intent to discontinue all mechanical ventilation and any other medical inter-
vention soon.”).
165. Complaint, supra note 10, at 4 (“Plaintiffs are Christians with firm religious beliefs
that as long as the heart is beating, Jahi is alive. . . . These religious beliefs involve provid-
ing all treatment, care, and nutrition to a body that is living, treating it with respect and
seeking to encourage its healing.”). Religious accommodations and exemptions have also
been asserted in other contexts. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)
(recognizing religious exemption to the Affordable Care Act’s contraception coverage
mandate).
166. See Stipulation for Protocol, supra note 17, at 1 (outlining procedure and parties’
roles for transfer from Children’s Hospital).
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where she presently receives post-mortem medical treatment that is
artificially prolonging her life.168 The hospital essentially made “rea-
sonable efforts” to accommodate Ms. Winkfield’s asserted religious be-
liefs by stipulating to transfer Ms. McMath to another healthcare
facility.169
In accommodating the family’s asserted religious beliefs, the hos-
pital facilitated post-mortem medical treatment to a brain-dead pa-
tient, even though there was zero probability that further medical
treatment would restore Ms. McMath’s life.170 The hospital yielded to
the family’s interest in artificially prolonging Ms. McMath’s life, which
outweighed the integrity and ethics of the medical profession, even
though the requested post-mortem treatment is “medically ineffec-
tive,”171 “contrary to generally accepted health care standards,”172 and
incompatible with the physician’s role as healer.173 Alternatively, the
hospital yielded to the family’s interest because any error was “not sus-
ceptible of correction.”174
This is perplexing because where a patient has an otherwise irre-
versible condition, the balance often tips in favor of the integrity and
ethics of the medical profession because healthcare providers may de-
cline to prolong a patient’s life on the ground that the requested
treatment is “medically ineffective,”175 “contrary to generally accepted
health care standards,”176 or for “reasons of conscience.”177 A health-
care provider’s refusal to comply with a patient’s medical decision or
instruction to prolong life is not always subject to review by an ethics
or medical committee,178 even though there is a lack of consensus
among healthcare providers regarding whether further medical treat-
167. Onishi, supra note 18; Romney, supra note 18 (reporting that Ms. McMath re-
mains on a ventilator and under care at a home in New Jersey).
168. Wells, supra note 16.
169. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1254.4(c)(2) (West Supp. 2015).
170. See Bernat, supra note 94, at 200 (discussing physician’s legal and moral obliga-
tions in the context of medical futility case study).
171. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4735 (West 2009).
172. Id.
173. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731–33 (1997); Pope, supra note 94, at
15–16.
174. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283 (1990).
175. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4735.
176. Id.
177. Id. § 4734.
178. Id. § 4736; but see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (West 2013) (re-
quiring review of a healthcare provider’s decision not to comply with a patient’s medical
directive by ethics or medical committee).
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ment is medically futile.179 Additionally, in the absence of brain-death,
a healthcare provider who refuses a request to prolong life is not re-
quired to make “reasonable efforts” to accommodate asserted relig-
ious or cultural practices made by the patient or patient’s family.180
The outcome in Ms. McMath’s case does not advance California’s
interest in protecting patient dignity and preventing unnecessary pain
and suffering,181 and suggests that there may be some liberty interest
to prolong life using available life-sustaining medical treatment, even
where continued treatment may be futile. But in following that logic,
a patient suffering from an irreversible condition who seeks to pro-
long life using available life-sustaining medical treatment is treated
differently from a brain-dead patient with the same desire. This results
in the unequal suppression of the personal autonomy to prolong life
using available life-sustaining medical treatment. Ultimately, in order
to retain the personal autonomy to prolong life, a patient suffering
from an irreversible condition must be declared brain-dead, and
therefore legally and medically dead. Given that the entire premise of
prolonging life is to evade death, the current scheme is paradoxical.
Conclusion
When given the opportunity to expand the recognition of addi-
tional asserted fundamental rights or liberty interests, the United
States Supreme Court usually tends to exercise restraint.182 Though
the Court has recognized the liberty interest in refusing life-sustaining
medical treatment,183 it has not addressed the question of whether
there is a fundamental right or liberty interest to prolong life using
available life-sustaining medical treatment.184
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California and Texas’ recognition of medical futility and health-
care providers’ nearly unlimited discretion to withdraw all life-sus-
taining medical treatment upon satisfying procedural safeguards has
raised more issues than resolutions. The Texas Advance Directives
Act’s disqualifying factor for pregnant female patients is arguably a
sex-based classification that violates Equal Protection principles and
substantive due process because it does not distinguish between fetal
pre-viability and post-viability,185 and therefore does not accommo-
date a pregnant female patient’s personal autonomy to both refuse
unwanted medical treatment186 and to terminate her pregnancy.187
Additionally, a California healthcare provider’s discretion to termi-
nate medical treatment to brain-dead patients may be limited if the
provider must make “reasonable efforts” to accommodate asserted re-
ligious or cultural practices made by the patient or patient’s family.188
This results in the unequal suppression of the personal autonomy to
prolong life using available life-sustaining medical treatment. The cir-
cumstances in Mrs. Mun˜oz and Ms. McMath’s cases clearly demon-
strate the perplexing outcomes that result from Texas and California’s
recognition of medical futility, specifically where patients must die to
retain any personal autonomy.
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